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Abstract. Many millions of users routinely use their Google, Facebook
and Microsoft accounts to log in to websites supporting OAuth 2.0-based
single sign on. The security of OAuth 2.0 is therefore of critical impor-
tance, and it has been widely examined both in theory and in practice.
In this paper we disclose a new class of practical attacks on OAuth 2.0
implementations, which we call Partial Redirection URI Manipulation
Attacks. An attack of this type can be used by an attacker to gain a
victim user’s OAuth 2.0 code (a token representing a right to access user
data) without the user’s knowledge; this code can then be used to im-
personate the user to the relevant relying party website. We examined
27 leading OAuth 2.0 identity providers, and found that 19 of them are
vulnerable to these attacks.
1 Introduction
Since the OAuth 2.0 authorisation framework was published at the end of 2012
[8], it has been adopted by a large number of websites worldwide as a means of
providing single sign-on (SSO) services. By using OAuth 2.0, websites can reduce
the burden of password management for their users, as well as saving users
the inconvenience of re-entering attributes that are instead stored by identity
providers and provided to relying parties as required.
There is a correspondingly rich infrastructure of identity providers (IdPs)
providing identity services using OAuth 2.0. This is demonstrated by the fact
that some Relying Parties (RPs), such as the website USATODAY3, support as
many as six different IdPs — see Fig. 1.
As discussed in section 4, the security of OAuth 2.0 has been analysed both
theoretically, e.g. using formal methods, and practically, involving looking at
implementations of OAuth 2.0. The research methodology used in most of this
work involves treating RPs and IdPs as black boxes; because of the inherent
limitations of this approach, it is likely that potential implementation flaws and
3 https://login.usatoday.com/USAT-GUP/authenticate/?
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Fig. 1. The OAuth 2.0 IdPs supported by USATODAY
attack vectors exist that have yet to be found. Illustrating this, in this paper we
disclose a new class of practical attacks on OAuth 2.0 implementations, which
we call Partial Redirection URI Manipulation (PRURIM) attacks, that affect
many leading real-world IdPs. These attacks either allow an attacker to log in
to the RP as the victim user or enable compromise of potentially sensitive user
information. We examined 27 leading OAuth 2.0 identity providers, and found
that 19 of them are vulnerable to PRURIM attacks.
OAuth 2.0 is used to protect many millions of user accounts and sensitive
user information stored at IdPs (e.g. Facebook, Google and Microsoft) and RP
servers around the world. It is therefore vitally important that the issues we
have identified are addressed urgently, and that IdPs take actions to mitigate
the threats of PRURIM attacks. In this connection we have notified the IdPs we
have found to be vulnerable to these attacks.
To summarise, we make the following contributions:
– We describe a new class of practical attacks, PRURIM attacks, on OAuth
2.0 implementations. These attacks can be used gain a victim user’s OAuth
2.0 code without the user’s knowledge.
– We examined the security of 27 leading OAuth 2.0 identity providers, and
found that 19 of them are vulnerable to PRURIM attacks.
– We propose practical improvements which can be adopted by OAuth 2.0
RPs and IdPs that address the identified problems.
– We reported our findings to the affected IdPs and helped them fix the prob-
lems we identified.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground on OAuth 2.0. In section 3 we describe implementation strategies that
RPs use to support multiple IdPs. Section 4 summarises previous work analysing
the security of real world OAuth 2.0 implementations. Section 5 describes the
PRURIM attacks, which are a threat to RPs that support multiple IdPs. In sec-
tion 6, we report our findings and discuss why PRURIM attacks are possible. In
section 7, we propose possible mitigations for these attacks. Section 8 describes
the disclosures made to affected IdPs, and the responses we received from them.
Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 OAuth 2.0
The OAuth 2.0 specification [8] describes a system that allows an application to
access resources (typically personal information) protected by a resource server
on behalf of the resource owner, through the consumption of an access token
issued by an authorization server. In support of this system, the OAuth 2.0
architecture involves the following four roles (see Fig. 2).
1. The Resource Owner is typically an end user.
2. The Resource Server is a server which stores the protected resources and
consumes access tokens provided by an authorization server.
3. The Client is an application running on a server, which makes requests on
behalf of the resource owner (the Client is the RP when OAuth 2.0 is used
for SSO).
4. The Authorization Server generates access tokens for the client, after authen-
ticating the resource owner and obtaining its authorization (the Resource
Server and Authorization Server together constitute the IdP when OAuth
2.0 is used for SSO).
Fig. 2 provides an overview of the operation of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. The
client initiates the process by sending (1) an authorization request to the resource
owner. In response, the resource owner generates an authorization grant (or
authorization response) in the form of a code, and sends it (2) to the client. After
receiving the authorization grant, the client initiates an access token request by
authenticating itself to the authorization server and presenting the authorization
grant, i.e. the code issued by the resource owner (3). The authorization server
issues (4) an access token to the client after successfully authenticating the client
and validating the authorization grant. The client makes a protected source
request by presenting the access token to the resource server (5). Finally, the
resource server sends (6) the protected resources to the client after validating
the access token.
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Fig. 2. OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow
2.2 OAuth 2.0 used for SSO
In order to use OAuth 2.0 as the basis of an SSO system, the following role
mapping is used:
– the resource server and authorization server together play the IdP role;
– the client plays the role of the RP;
– the resource owner corresponds to the user.
OAuth 2.0 SSO systems build on user agent (UA) redirections, where a user
(U) wishes to access services protected by the RP which consumes the access
token generated by the IdP. The UA is typically a web browser. The IdP provides
ways to authenticate the user, asks the user to grant permission for the RP to
access the user’s attributes, and generates an access token on behalf of the user.
After receiving the access token, the RP can access the user’s attributes using
the API provided by the IdP.
The OAuth 2.0 framework defines four ways for RPs to obtain access tokens,
namely Authorization Code Grant, Implicit Grant, Resource Owner Password,
and Client Credentials Grant. In this paper we are only concerned with the
Authorization Code Grant and Implicit Grant protocol flows. Note that, in the
descriptions below, protocol parameters given in bold font are defined as required
(i.e. mandatory) in the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [8].
RP Registration The RP must register with the IdP before it can use OAuth
2.0. During registration, the IdP gathers security-critical information about the
RP, including the RP’s redirect URI, i.e. redirect uri , the URI to which the
user agent is redirected after the IdP has generated the authorization response
and sent it to the RP via the UA. As part of registration, the IdP issues the RP
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with a unique identifier (client id) and, optionally, a secret (client secret). If
defined, client secret is used by the IdP to authenticate the RP when using the
Authorization Code Grant flow.
Authorization Code Grant We next briefly review the operation of OAuth
2.0 Authorization Code Grant. This flow relies on certain information having
been established during the registration process, as described in section 2.2. An
instance of use of the protocol proceeds as follows.
1. U → RP: The user clicks a login button on the RP website, as displayed by
the UA, which causes the UA to send an HTTP request to the RP.
2. RP → UA: The RP produces an OAuth 2.0 authorization request and sends
it back to the UA. The authorization request includes client id , the iden-
tifier for the client which the RP registered with the IdP previously; re-
sponse type=code , indicating that the Authorization Code Grant method
is requested; redirect uri, the URI to which the IdP will redirect the UA after
access has been granted; state, an opaque value used by the RP to maintain
state between the request and the callback (step 6 below); and scope, the
scope of the requested permission.
3. UA → IdP: The UA redirects the request which it received in step 2 to the
IdP.
4. IdP → UA: The IdP first compares the value of redirect uri it received in
step 3 (embedded in the authorization request) with the registered value
(how redirect uri is compared is described in section 3.1); if the comparison
fails, the process terminates. If the user has already been authenticated by
the IdP, then the next step is skipped. If not, the IdP returns a login form
which is used to collect the user authentication information.
5. U → UA → IdP: The user completes the login form and grants permission
for the RP to access the attributes stored by the IdP.
6. IdP → UA → RP: After (if necessary) using the information provided in
the login form to authenticate the user, the IdP generates an authorization
response and redirects the UA back to the RP. The authorization response
contains code , the authorization code (representing the authorization grant)
generated by the IdP; and state, the value sent in step 2.
7. RP → IdP: The RP produces an access token request and sends it to the
IdP token endpoint directly (i.e. not via the UA). The request includes
grant type=authorization code , client id , client secret (if the RP has
been issued one), code (generated in step 6), and the redirect uri .
8. IdP → RP: The IdP checks client id , client secret (if present), code and
redirect uri and, if the checks succeed, responds to the RP with access token.
9. RP → IdP: The RP passes access token to the IdP via a defined API to
request the user attributes.
10. IdP → RP: The IdP checks access token (how this works is not specified
in the OAuth 2.0 specification) and, if satisfied, sends the requested user
attributes to the RP.
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Implicit Grant The Implicit Grant protocol flow has a similar sequence of
steps to Authorization Code Grant. We specify below only those steps where
the Implicit Grant flow differs from the Authorization Code Grant flow.
2. RP → UA: The RP produces an OAuth 2.0 authorization request and sends
it back to the UA. The authorization request includes client id , the iden-
tifier for the client which the RP registered with the IdP previously; re-
sponse type=token , indicating that the Implicit Grant is requested; redi-
rect uri, the URI to which the IdP will redirect the UA after access has been
granted; state, an opaque value used by the RP to maintain state between
the request and the callback (step 6 below); and scope, the scope of the
requested permission.
6. IdP → UA → RP: After (if necessary) using the information provided in the
login form to authenticate the user, the IdP generates an access token and
redirects the UA back to the RP using the value of redirect uri provided in
step 2. The access token is appended to redirect uri as a URI fragment (i.e.
as a suffix to the URI following a # symbol).
As URI fragments are not sent in HTTP requests, the access token is not
immediately transferred when the UA is redirected to the RP. Instead, the RP
returns a web page (typically an HTML document with an embedded script)
capable of accessing the full redirection URI, including the fragment retained by
the UA, and extracting the access token (and other parameters) contained in
the fragment; the retrieved access token is returned to the RP. The RP can now
use this access token to retrieve data stored at the IdP.
3 Supporting multiple IdPs
As described in section 1, many RPs support more than one IdP. This recognises
the fact that users will have trust relationships with varying sets of IdPs — for
example, one user may prefer to trust Facebook, whereas another may prefer
Google.
In this section we describe two ways in which this is achieved in practice. The
first approach (using redirect URIs) gives rise to the new class of attacks which
we describe in section 5. The second approach (explicit user intention tracking)
gives rise to the IdP mix-up attacks described by Fett et al. [7].
3.1 Using redirect URIs
One way in which an RP can support multiple IdPs is to register a different
redirect uri with each IdP, and to set up a sign-in endpoint for each. It can then
use the endpoint on which it receives an authorization response to recognise
which IdP sent it. For example, AddThis4 has registered the URIs
4 http://www.addthis.com/
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– https://www.addthis.com/darkseid/account/register-facebook-return
as its redirect uri for Facebook, and
– https://www.addthis.com/darkseid/account/register-google-return
as its redirect uri for Google.
If AddThis receives an authorization response at the endpoint https://www.
addthis.com/darkseid/account/register-facebook-return?code=[code_generated_
by_Facebook], (in step 7 of section 2.2), it assumes that this response was gener-
ated by Facebook, and thus sends the authorization code to the Facebook server
(step 8 of section 2.2) to request an access token.
The redirect uri in OAuth 2.0 As described in section 2.2, an RP must
register with an IdP before it can use OAuth 2.0. The OAuth 2.0 Authoriza-
tion Framework [8] defines the following two ways in which an IdP can register
redirect uri for an RP.
1. The IdP should require the RP to provide the complete redirection URI.
2. If requiring the registration of the complete redirection URI is not possible,
the IdP should require the registration of the URI scheme, authority, and
path. This allows the RP to dynamically vary only the query component of
the redirection URI when requesting authorization.
As described in §3.1.2 of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [8], the
redirection endpoint URI must be an absolute URI. The framework requires
the authorization server to match the received redirect uri value against the
redirection URIs registered by the RP when a redirection URI is included in an
authorization request. Also, if the redirect uri registered by the RP includes the
full redirection URI, the IdP must compare the two URIs using a simple string
comparison [15].
Real-world Implementations of redirect uri Checks As noted above, the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [8] requires the IdP to check the two URIs
using a simple string comparison if the registered redirect uri value includes
the full redirection URI; however, this is not always done. In practice, we have
identified three approaches used by real-world IdPs to check the redirect uri.
– Checking only the origin of redirect uri . Many IdPs, including Face-
book5, Yahoo6 and Microsoft7, only check the origin part of redirect uri. For
example, suppose an RP registers https://www.RP.com/facebook-return
as its redirect uri with Facebook. When Facebook receives an authorization
request generated by this RP, it only checks whether the origin part of redi-
rect uri in the authorization request matches https://www.RP.com, i.e. it
ignores /facebook-return.
5 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/web
6 https://developer.yahoo.com/oauth2/guide/
7 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh243647.aspx
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– Checking redirect uri using a simple string comparison. Some IdPs,
such as Google8 and Amazon9, execute a simple string comparison when per-
forming a redirect uri check (as required in [8]) on the authorization request.
Other IdPs, such as OK10 and Yandex11, perform a redirect uri check by ex-
ecuting a simple string comparison only when generating the authorization
response, i.e. they accept an unauthorised OAuth 2.0 request as described in
listing 1.1, but refuse to generate an OAuth 2.0 response for such a request.
– Issuing an IdP-generated value for redirect uri . Some IdPs, such
as ebay12, issue a redirect uri value (e.g. Jerry_Smith-JerrySmi-TestOA-
pkvmjju) to the RP when the RP registers with the IdP. When the IdP
receives an authorization request generated by this RP, it first compares the
redirect uri (i.e. Jerry_Smith-JerrySmi-TestOA-pkvmjju in this example)
in the authorization request with the value it has stored in its database. If
the two values agree, it generates an authorization response and sends it
to the redirect URI that the IdP retrieved using the redirect uri value (i.e.
Jerry_Smith-JerrySmi-TestOA-pkvmjju in this example).
3.2 Explicit User Intention Tracking
Registering a different redirection URI for each IdP is not the only approach
that could be used by an RP to support multiple IdPs. An RP can instead keep
a record of the IdP each user wishes to use to authenticate (e.g. it could save
the identity of the user’s selected IdP to a cookie).
In this case, when a authorization response is received by the RP, the RP can
retrieve the identity of the IdP from the cookie and then send the code to this
IdP. This method is typically used by RPs that allow for dynamic registration,
where using the same URI is an obvious implementation choice [7].
4 Security properties of OAuth 2.0
OAuth 2.0 has been analysed using formal methods [1–4, 7, 17, 20]. Pai et al.
[17] confirmed a security issue described in the OAuth 2.0 Thread Model [14]
using the Alloy Framework [9]. Chari et al. analysed OAuth 2.0 in the Universal
Composability Security framework [4] and showed that OAuth 2.0 is secure if all
the communications links are SSL-protected. Frostig and Slack [20] discovered a
cross site request forgery attack in the Implicit Grant flow of OAuth 2.0, using
the Murphi framework [6]. Bansal et al. [1] analysed the security of OAuth 2.0
using the WebSpi [2] and ProVerif models [3]. However, all this work is based on
abstract models, and so delicate implementation details are ignored.
8 https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/OAuth2
9 http://login.amazon.com/website
10 https://apiok.ru/ext/oauth/
11 https://tech.yandex.com/oauth/
12 https://developer.ebay.com/Devzone/merchant-products/account-
management/HowTo/oauth.html
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The security properties of real-world OAuth 2.0 implementations have also
been examined by a number of authors [5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24]. Wang et al.
[22] examined deployed SSO systems, focussing on a logic flaw present in many
such systems, including OpenID. In parallel, Sun and Beznosov [21] also studied
deployed OAuth 2.0 systems. Later, Li and Mitchell [10] examined the security
of deployed OAuth 2.0 systems providing services in Chinese. In parallel, Zhou
and Evans [24] conducted a large scale study of the security of Facebook’s OAuth
2.0 implementation. Chen et al. [5], and Shehab and Mohsen [18] have looked
at the security of OAuth 2.0 implementations on mobile platforms. Finally, Li
and Mitchell [11] conducted an empirical study of the security of the OpenID
Connect-based SSO service provided by Google.
We conclude this review by mentioning prior art that has a close relationship
to the PRURIM attacks described below.
– The cross social-network request forgery attack was described by Bansal,
Bhargavan and Maffeis [1]. It applies to RPs using third party libraries, such
as JanRain or GigYa, to manage their IdPs, as these RPs use the same login
endpoint for all IdPs.
– A similar attack, the Redirection URI Manipulation Attack, is defined
in §10.6 of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework; in this attack, the
attacker sets the redirect uri in the authorization request to that of the
attacker’s own website (e.g. https://www.attacker.com).
– Another attack with a similar outcome, the IdP mix-up attack due to Fett
et al. [7], works in the context of RPs using explicit user intention tracking to
support multiple IdPs, as described in section 3.2. For it to work, a network
attack is needed to modify the http or https messages generated by the RP
in step 1 (see section 2.2). Li and Mitchell [12] argued that this attack would
not be a genuine threat to the security of OAuth 2.0 if IdP implementations
strictly follow the standard.
5 A New Class of Attacks
We now introduce PRURIM attacks, which can be used by a malicious party to
collect a code belonging to a victim user without the user being aware. These
attacks exploit the fact that many IdPs only check the origin part of the redi-
rect uri (as discussed in section 3.1). In sections 5.2 and 5.3 we describe two
variants of the attack with differing assumptions about the capabilities of the
attacker.
5.1 Adversary Model
We suppose that the adversary has the capabilities of a web attacker, i.e. it
can share malicious links or post comments which contain malicious content (e.g.
stylesheets or images) on a benign website, and/or can exploit vulnerabilities in
an RP website. The malicious content might trigger the web browser to send
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an HTTP/HTTPS request to an RP and IdP using either the GET or POST
methods, or execute JavaScript scripts crafted by the attacker.
In addition, in the first of the two variants of the PRURIM attack described
in section 5.2, we suppose that the adversary can set up a server which acts
as an OAuth 2.0 IdP; we refer to this as a Malicious IdP (MIdP). In the sec-
ond PRURIM variant (see section 5.3) we assume instead that the RP website
contains an Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability.
5.2 Using a MIdP
We divide our discussion of the first PRURIM attack variant into three parts.
We first describe the core of the attack, in which the attacker is able to obtain
a victim user’s code. We then describe two ways in which knowledge of this code
can be used to perform unauthorised actions.
This attack applies to both the authorization code grant and implicit grant
flows. For simplicity we only present the attack for the authorization code grant
flow. We describe real-world examples of these attacks in section 6.
Obtaining the code As described in section 3.1, many IdPs only check the
origin of the redirect uri . If the redirect uri is not fully checked, an attacker can
change part of it without the change being detected by the IdP. This observation
underlies the following attack.
Suppose an attacker can, in some way, cause a victim user’s browser to gen-
erate (unknown to the user) an unauthorised authorization request for the tar-
get IdP (TIdP) of the form given in listing 1.1. This might, for example, be
achieved by inserting the request in an iframe or img in an apparently inno-
cent web page, which the victim user is persuaded to visit. When it receives
this request, the TIdP will assume that it is a normal authorization request
generated by the RP, as it only checks the origin part of the redirect uri . It
then authenticates the victim user, if necessary (see step 4 in section 2.2), and
then generates an authorization response. This response is sent to the URL
https://RP.com/MIdP-return?code=[code_generated_by_TIdP].
When the RP receives this code, it first constructs an access token request
which includes the code, and then sends it to the MIdP. The attacker (MIdP)
now has the user’s code; this code can now be used for a range of malicious
purposes. We describe below two examples of how this value might be used.
1 // a normal authorization request generated by the RP supporting
for target IdP (TIdP)
2 https://TIdP.com/auth2?
3 client id=[client id generated by TIdP]&
4 redirect uri=https://RP.com/TIdP−return&
5 response type=code
6
7 // an unauthorised authorization request crafted by the attacker
(MIdP)
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8 https://TIdP.com/auth2?
9 client id=[client id generated by TIdP]&
10 redirect uri=https://RP.com/MIdP−return&
11 response type=code
Listing 1.1. The Partial Redirect URI Manipulate Attack
An Impersonation Attack An attacker with access to a victim user’s code
for a particular TIdP can use it to impersonate this user in the following way.
The attacker first initiates a new login process at an RP using the attacker’s
own browser (we suppose this RP supports SSO using the TIdP). The attacker
chooses the TIdP as the IdP for this login process, and the attacker’s browser is
accordingly redirected to the TIdP. The attacker provides his/her own account
information to the TIdP. After authenticating the attacker, the TIdP generates
an authorization response containing a code and tries to redirect the attacker’s
browser back to the RP website (step 6 in section 2.2).
The attacker intercepts this redirection, replacing the TIdP-supplied code
in the authorization response with the stolen code for the victim user. It now
forwards the modified response to the RP.
The RP next uses the supplied (stolen) code to retrieve an access token from
the TIdP. The retrieved access token is then used to retrieve the victim user’s id.
The RP now believes that the attacker is the owner of the victim user’s account,
and issues a session cookie for this account to the attacker. The attacker is now
logged in to the RP as the victim user and can access the victim user’s protected
resources stored at the RP.
Accessing User Data stored by the TIdP Suppose an attacker has the code
for a particular victim user at the TIdP, and suppose also that the TIdP did
not issue a client secret to the RP (this is possible because client secret is an
optional parameter in the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework). In this case,
the attacker uses the code to construct an access token request (see step 8 in
section 2.2) and sends it to the TIdP. The TIdP, in return, sends an access token
for the victim user to the attacker. The attacker can now use this access token
to access the victim user’s protected resources stored at the TIdP.
5.3 Using an XSS Vulnerability at the RP
This second variant of the PRURIM attack again applies to both the authoriza-
tion code grant and implicit grant flows. As above, we only present the attack
for the authorization code grant flow.
According to the OWASP Top 10 – 2013 report [16], XSS attacks are ranked
as the third most critical web application security risk. That implies that it is
likely that at least some RP websites contain an XSS vulnerability.
1 // an unauthorised authorization request crafted by the attacker
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2 https://TIdP.com/auth2?
3 client id=[client id generated by TIdP]&
4 redirect uri=https://RP.com/XXSVul&
5 response type=code
6 // JavaScripts used to extract the code from the authorization
response
7 <script>
8 var code = document.URL.replace("?", "&");
9 var src = "http://www.attack.com?RP=" + code;
10 var img = document.createElement("img");
11 img.src = src;
12 document.appendChild(img);
13 </script>
Listing 1.2. The Redirect URI Manipulate Attack
For the purposes of describing this attack we assume that the RP has a
XSS vulnerability at https://RP.com/XXSVul which is under the control of the
attacker. The attacker first (by some means) causes a victim user to generate an
unauthorised authorization request for the target IdP (TIdP) of the form given
in listing 1.2. When it receives this request, the TIdP assumes that it is a normal
authorization request generated by the RP, as it only checks the origin part of
the redirect uri . It then authenticates the victim user, if necessary (see step 4
in section 2.2), and then generates an authorization response. This response is
sent to the URL https://RP.com/XXSVul?code=[code_generated_by_TIdP].
The script (see listing 1.2) crafted by the attacker at XXSVul is assumed to be
able to extract the value of https://RP.com/XXSVul?code=[code_generated_
by_TIdP]; once it has done this it sends it back to the attacker. The attacker
now has the user’s code, which can now be used to conduct an impersonation
attack and/or access user data stored at TIdP, as described in sections 5.2 and
5.2.
5.4 Discussion
As noted above, the attack variants described in sections 5.2 and 5.3 also apply to
the implicit grant flow. Depending on the precise type of attack (and assumptions
about the capabilities of the attacker), an attacker is able to obtain varying sets
of sensitive values — see table 1.
The no state in the table means that the attack only works if the RP fails to
implement CSRF countermeasures at its MIdP sign-in endpoint. This might be
made more likely if the MIdP provides sample code without the state parameter
in the OAuth 2.0 authorization request, or configures the MIdP to not include
the state in the authorization response before it is sent to the RP.
5.5 Relationship to the prior art
We conclude this section by describing how the PRURIM attack differs from
three somewhat similar attacks described in section 4.
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Authorization Code Grant Implicit Grant
PRURIM Attacks Using MIdP using XSS using MIdP Using XSS
Attack
Assumption
MIdP,
web attacker,
no state
XSS vul at RP,
web attacker
MIdP,
web attacker,
no state
XSS vul at RP,
web attacker
Attackers
can get
access token,
code
access token,
code
access token access token
Table 1. Redirect URI Manipulate Attacks
– The cross social-network request forgery attack, due to Bansal et al. [1],
applies to RPs that use third party libraries, as these RPs use the same login
endpoint for all IdPs. By contrast, the PRURIM attack works in situations
where IdPs only check the origin of the redirect uri . While the Bansal et
al. attack only works for a special category of RPs, PRURIM attacks apply
to all IdPs not strictly checking the redirect uri , and to all RPs using these
IdPs.
– In the Redirection URI Manipulation Attack, the attacker sets the
redirect uri in the authorization request to that of the attacker’s own web-
site (e.g. https://www.attacker.com). The key difference between this attack
and the PRURIM attacks is that, in a PRURIM attack, the attacker is not
required to change the origin of the redirect uri , making it a much greater
threat in practice.
– The IdP mix-up attack due to Fett et al. [7] works in the context of
RPs using explicit user intention tracking to support multiple IdPs; for it
to work, a network attack is needed to modify the http or https messages
generated by the RP. PRURIM attacks, by contrast, apply to RPs using
different redirect uri values to support multiple IdPs. IdP mix-up attacks
need a network attacker and a MIdP to operate; PRURIM attacks only
need a web attacker and a MIdP to work, making them a much greater
threat in practice.
6 Our Findings
6.1 Summary
We examined the implementations of 27 popular OAuth 2.0 IdPs providing ser-
vices in English, Russian and Chinese (see table 2)13. Unfortunately, our study
revealed that 19 of them (70%) are vulnerable to PRURIM attacks (see figure
3). Among the 19 affected IdPs, one is Russian-language, namely mail.ru; four
provide services in English, namely Facebook, Microsoft, Instagram and Yahoo;
13 Most of the English and Russian language IdPs were chosen from the login page of
https://badoo.com/ and https://usatoday.com/. Most of the Chinese-language
IdPs were chosen from the login page of http://youku.com, http://www.iqiyi.com
and http://ctrip.com
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and as many as 14 IdPs are providing services in Chinese, meaning that 88% of
the IdPs in China in our study are vulnerable to PRURIM attacks.
Fig. 3. IdP vulnerabilities by language of site
6.2 Implications
As described in 3.1, in order to allow the RP to dynamically vary only the query
component of the redirection URI when requesting authorization, many IdPs
only require an RP to register the URI scheme, authority, and path. For example,
iQiyi14 registers http://passport.iqiyi.com/apis/thirdparty/ncallback.
action (together with a varying query component) with every IdP it supports,
and it uses the query component in the redirect uri to determine the IdP used
(e.g. http://passport.iqiyi.com/apis/thirdparty/ncallback.action?from=
2 is the redirect uri registered with IdP Wangyi, http://passport.iqiyi.com/
apis/thirdparty/ncallback.action?from=30 is the redirect uri registered with
IdP Xiaomi). This reduces the effort for the RP to manage redirect uri values for
multiple IdPs, and gives the RP the ability to customize its OAuth 2.0 sign-in
endpoint.
14 http://www.iqiyi.com/
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It is interesting to speculate why the standard does not define a single manda-
tory approach for the IdP to register a redirect uri value with an RP; it seems
plausible that this is to give maximum flexibility for RP implementations. As a
result, many IdPs allow RPs to register a range of types of redirect uri, and in
many cases the IdP only checks the origin part of a redirect uri in an authoriza-
tion request. This flexibility makes possible the attacks we have described.
IdP Vulnerable to PRURIM
1 Amazon no
2 ebay no
3 Facebook yes
4 Google no
5 Microsoft yes
6 Instagram yes
7 Yahoo yes
8 mail.ru yes
9 OK no
10 VK no
11 Yandex no
12 Baidu yes
13 Douban no
14 Jindong no
15 Mi yes
16 QQ yes
17 QQ Weibo yes
18 Sina yes
19 Taobao yes
20 Wangyi yes
21 Wechat yes
22 anonymised-site-1 yes
23 anonymised-site-2 yes
24 anonymised-site-3 yes
25 anonymised-site-4 yes
26 anonymised-site-5 yes
27 anonymised-site-6 yes
Table 2: IdPs examined
7 Mitigations for PRURIM Attacks
7.1 Impose strict redirect URI checking
PRURIM attacks are made possible if an IdP only checks part of the redirect uri.
A simple mitigation for this attack is therefore for the IdP to always check
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the complete redirect uri using a simple string comparison [15]. However, this
can cause problems for those RPs that rely on the origin of the redirect uri to
deliver an authorization response. In such cases, the OAuth 2.0 service would
stop working if a strict check is always performed.
7.2 Implement CSRF countermeasures
While the main reason that the MIdP-based PRURIM attack is possible is the
failure to strictly check the redirect uri , to make the process work the attacker
also needs to use a CSRF attack to cause the victim user to visit the site serving
the malicious authorization request. This means that the implementation of
appropriate CSRF countermeasures by RPs (e.g. including a state value in the
authorization request) would help to mitigate the threat of the PRURIM attacks
described in section 5.2.
However, in practice, RPs do not always implement CSRF countermeasures
in the recommended way. A study conducted by Shernan et al. [19] in 2015 found
that 25% of websites in the Alexa Top 10,000 domains using Facebook’s OAuth
2.0 service appear vulnerable to CSRF attacks. Further, a 2016 study conducted
by Yang et al. [23] revealed that 61% of 405 websites using OAuth 2.0 (chosen
from the 500 top-ranked US and Chinese websites) did not implement CSRF
countermeasures.
While it is up to the RP to implement CSRF countermeasures, a MIdP can
make it less likely that this will happen, e.g. by not including a state variable in
its sample code, or by not including a state value in an authorization response
even if it is included in the authorization request.
8 Responsible disclosure
We reported our findings to all the affected IdPs that provide services in English
or Russian. However, reporting our finding to the affected Chinese IdPs was a
little more difficult; since 20th July, 2016, China’s biggest bug report platform
Wooyun15 has been closed. We reported the problem to the eight IdPs that have
set up a security response centre in China; for the other six IdPs affected by the
PRURIM attacks, for which we had no obvious way to report our findings, we
have simply chosen not to disclose their identities in this paper.
We received positive responses from Yahoo, Microsoft, mail.ru, Sina and
Wangyi. These IdPs all stated that they are working on a fix to the PRURIM
attack. Facebook also acknowledged our report, but did not commit to mak-
ing any changes. However, Tencent (the largest Chinese IdP, including QQ IdP,
Wechat IdP and QQWeibo IdP) and Baidu both stated that the attack is caused
by the RP redirection configuration and do not propose to take any action. Sim-
ilarly, the response from Xiaomi IdP was “Xiaomi’s responsibility of its OAuth
2.0 system is only to authorize user, it is the RP’s responsibility to protect the
15 http://www.wooyun.org
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authorization”, and thus it seems reasonable to assume that it will not take any
action to address the problem. Finally, Taobao IdP (owned by Alibaba) stated
that the attacker cannot get the user’s code, and hence they do not propose to
take any action.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we described the PRURIM attacks, a new class of attacks against
OAuth 2.0. These attacks work against RPs supporting multiple OAuth 2.0 IdPs.
We examined 27 IdPs providing services in English, Russian and Chinese. Given
the fact that OAuth 2.0 has been widely adopted by IdPs around the world, our
study only covers the tip of the iceberg of real-world OAuth 2.0 implementations
that are potentially vulnerable to PRURIM attacks.
We have also proposed mitigations for this new attack which can be adopted
by IdPs and RPs.
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